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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Implicit in the Roberson holding is the proposition that had the
subsequent death been caused by injuries sustained in the accident, a
prompt motion to amend would have been granted. Apparently, the
distinction between amended and supplemental pleadings has become
blurred to the point that in and of itself it is not a ground for deny-
ing a motion to amend." Instead, the court's power to deny the motion
on the basis of prejudice to the opposing party should become the focal
point of inquiry. Where, as in Roberson, the lapse of time reeks of
injustice, the motion to amend is properly denied.
CPLR 203(e): Notice requirement of section is not satisfied when
movant seeks to change the status in which party is sued.
Under CPLR 203(e), may a claim asserted in an amended plead-
ing against a party as defendant be deemed to relate back to notice
contained in the original complaint which was received by the party in
his status as plaintiff? The Supreme Court, Nassau County, answered
this question negatively in Ward v. MarinoY
In Ward an action was commenced on behalf of Linda Ward to
recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident and
on behalf of the estate of Thomas Ward, a passenger in a car driven by
Linda Ward, to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful
death. Subsequent to the Court of Appeals decision in Gelbman v.
Gelbman,10 the executrix of Thomas Ward's estate sought leave to
serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint asserting a
claim for personal injuries and wrongful death against Linda Ward.
In response, the statute of limitations defense was raised.
The court was confronted with two alternatives in deciding
whether the claim was embodied by CPLR 203(e). On the one hand,
it could compare the instant situation to the case wherein the plaintiff
does not seek to add new parties, but merely to change the capacity in
which the defendant is sued, e.g., from trustee capacity to individual
capacity. On the other hand, the court could compare the proposed
amendment to the instance where a plaintiff is asserting a claim against
a third-party defendant. In the former situation, the statute of limita-
tions is not a bar;" in the latter case, the claim is time-barred 12 (even
8 See Werner Spitz Constr. Co. v. Vanderlinde Elec. Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 157, 314
N.Y.S.2d 567 (Monroe County Ct. 1970) (term "amended" under 203(e) embraces supple-
mental as well as amended pleadings).
9 64 Misc. 2d 44, 313 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
10 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969) (doctrine of intrafamily im-
munity abolished); see also 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 127 (1969).
11 Boyd v. United States Mort. & Trust Co., 187 N.Y. 262, 79 N.E. 999 (1907).
[Vol. 45:500
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
if the third-party defendant had been impleaded before the statute of
limitations on plaintiff's claim had expired 13) and unsalvable despite
CPLR 203(e). The court reasoned that the second situation was more
closely analogous and denied the motion for leave to amend. Thus,
although it cannot be gainsaid that the party received notice of the
transaction or occurrence sought to be proved by the amended plead-
ing, the court has limited the operation of CPLR 203(e) to claims
asserted by an amended pleading against a party in the same status in
which he was originally summoned.
CPLR 205(a): Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction does not bar
commencement of second action where defendant has been properly
served.
CPLR 205(a) permits a diligent suitor to commence a new action,
upon the same cause of action,14 within six months from the termina-
tion of a prior action, if the earlier action was timely commenced and
was not terminated by voluntary discontinuance, dismissal for neglect
to prosecute,'6 or final judgment on the merits.16 Consequently, a party
is enabled to escape the harsh effects of the statute of limitations by
demonstrating that the prior action had been "timely commenced."
The initiation of an action in good faith17 by service of process consti-
tutes timely commencement, even though the forum selected by the
plaintiff lacks subject matter jurisdiction.' S Where, however, the defen-
dant is not properly served, the beneficial aspects of CPLR 205 are
deemed inapposite. 9
In Amato v. Svedi20 plaintiff commenced an action in the New
12 McCabe v. Queensboro Farm Prods. Inc., 15 App. Div. 2d 553, 223 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d
Dep't), aff'd, 11 N.Y2d 963, 183 N.E.2d 326, 229 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1962).
13 Trybus v. Nipark Realty Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 563, 271 N.Y.S.2d 5 (2d Dep't 1966).
14 Under CPA 23, a new action was permitted on "the same cause." Hence, a plaintiff
was allowed to commence a second action for breach of warranty after the dismissal of an
action for fraud. Titus v. Poole, 145 N.Y. 414, 40 N.E. 228 (1895). Notwithstanding the
variance in language, it has been held that Titus is still good law under the CPLR.
Kavanau v. Virtis Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 754, 800 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Ist Dep't 1969) (quantum
meruit claim permitted after dismissal of action for breach of contract). See generally 7B
McKINNEY's CPLR 205, supp. commentary at 46-47 (1970).
15 For a discussion of dismissals other than those warranted by CPIR 3216 which will
bar the commencement of a second action, see 7B McKINNY'S CPLR 205, supp. commen-
taries at 47-48, 49 (1968, 1966, 1965).
16 For an interesting application of this section, see Buchholz v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 269 App. Div. 2d 49, 53 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1st Dep't 1945).
17 "The rule of the statute was enacted to meet the exigencies of the ordinary rather
than the exceptional case, to save the rights of the honest rather than the fraudulent
suitor." Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 541, 109 N.E. 594, 596 (1915).
1S Id.
19 Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1923) (service pursuant to a void or-
der of publication).
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